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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No- 920853-CA

v*
Priority No. 2

COREY LYNN BROOKS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Corey Lynn Brooks appeals his convictions of
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 and 76-6-203 (1990), both first degree
felonies, entered upon jury verdicts, and possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (Supp. 1992), a second degree felony,
entered upon a bench verdict.

The convictions were entered by

the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding.

The Utah Supreme Court

had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i)
(1992).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992),

the supreme court transferred this appeal to this Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Do the principles of either "plain error" or

"ineffective assistance of counsel" overcome defendant's triallevel waiver of jury selection issues, such that a new trial
should be ordered?

Absent post-trial evidentiary proceedings,

appellate review for plain error or counsel ineffectiveness is
necessarily conducted de novo, without reference to traditional
standards of review, upon examination of the underlying trial
record.

See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174-75 (Utah App.

1992), and authorities cited therein.
2.

Was defendant permissibly convicted of both

aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, where the same
criminal episode included both a home entry and a taking of
property by force or fear?

Properly framed, this question asks

whether, upon examining the defining statutes, either the
burglary or the robbery is a lesser included offense within the
other, such that defendant could not properly be convicted of
both.

As such, it is a question of law, reviewed without

deference to the trial court.

See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d

874, 877 (Utah 1985).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Many of the pertinent constitutional provisions,
statutes, and rules are set forth in Appendix 1 to defendant's
opening Brief of Appellant.

Utah's Jury Selection and Service

Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 78-46-1 through -23 (1992), containing
additional pertinent law in effect at the time of defendant's
March 1992 trial, is reproduced in Appendix I of this brief, as
is Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, the
"distribution of powers" provision•

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As set forth in his Brief of Appellant, defendant's
first trial on the aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary
charges resulted in a hung jury, and a mistrial ruling (R. 36).
Defendant then obtained new counsel, and was re-tried (R. 79,
261-847).l

Upon re-trial, the jury found defendant guilty of

both charges (R. 203-04).

Because defendant used a gun to commit

the offenses, and because he was on parole when he committed
them, the trial court then found defendant guilty of the
additional offense of possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person (R. 610).
Defendant was sentenced concurrently for each offense,
plus ordered to pay fines and make restitution; a consecutive
firearm enhancement was added.

These sentences were imposed to

run consecutive to another, uncompleted sentence at the Utah
State Prison (R. 210-17).

Trial counsel then withdrew, and the

Salt Lake Legal Defender Association resumed defendant's
representation for this appeal (R. 224-26).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Offenses
The evidence supporting the jury's verdict is fairly
straightforward.2

Defendant responded to a classified

*The State parenthetically references the trial transcript
(R. 261-847) by its contiguous numbering with the main record.
2,,

In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
to the verdict." State v. Seale, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 11 (Utah
Feb. 24, 1993) (citing authorities).
3

advertisement placed by Stephanie Vert, offering a distinctive
"marquise" diamond ring for sale (R. 340-44, 441-42).

He

examined the ring at the Vert home, spending thirty to forty-five
minutes in the company of Stephanie Vert and her mother, Martha
Vert (R. 346, 445). During this visit, defendant carried a large
"walkie-talkie" (R. 346, 446). Defendant told the Verts that he
wished to purchase the ring, and made arrangements to return to
their home the next morning for that purpose (R. 347, 446).
Stephanie Vert was the only person home when defendant
returned the next morning (R. 448-49).

Defendant still carried

the walkie-talkie, and was wearing a hat, gloves, and "rainbow"type sunglasses (R. 450-52).

Stephanie let defendant into the

home and offered him some coffee.

Defendant picked up the

diamond ring, then pointed a pistol at Stephanie and ordered her
to crawl into a bathroom (R. 452). When she complied, defendant
produced handcuffs and ordered Stephanie to cuff herself to
plumbing beneath the sink.

When she initially "did it wrong,"

defendant produced handcuff keys and made Stephanie re-cuff
herself.

He then threatened her, "You better not remember what I

look like" (R. 453-54).
Defendant spent ten to twelve minutes rummaging about
the Vert home (R. 457). Using the walkie-talkie, he spoke to an
apparent accomplice, arranging to be picked up outside the home
(R. 455-56).3

When defendant left, Stephanie freed herself by

defendant and the accomplice, Mark McGrath, had assisted
another friend in the purchase of a pistol about a week before
the robbery (R. 503-09, 561, 678-81). The inference drawn by the
4

unscrewing the plumbing, and summoned help (R. 457). Upon
inspection, the Verts estimated that defendant had stolen several
thousand dollars' worth of jewelry, including the diamond ring,
from their home (R. 354-61).
A day or two before the robbery, defendant had visited
a friend (R. 485). He had two pairs of handcuffs with him at
that time, one of which he had briefly placed on his friend's
young child.

The friend had also handled the cuffs, and

defendant talked about wiping fingerprints from them (R. 488).
Shortly after the robbery—apparently the same day—
defendant visited some other friends (R. 568-71, 642-43).

During

this visit, defendant displayed some jewelry, including a
marquise diamond ring, offering to sell the jewelry to these
friends (R. 572-73, 578, 644-45, 697-98).

Also during the visit,

defendant and his friends saw a television account of the Vert
robbery.

To one of these friends, defendant boasted that he had

committed the robbery (R. 648-50).

At the end of this visit,

defendant gave one item of jewelry—a gold or gold-plated chain—
to his friends (R. 573, 647). The friends subsequently called
the police, and turned the chain over to them (R. 574-77, 650).
Martha Vert later identified the chain as one of the items taken
from her home (R. 357-58).

This was apparently the only stolen

item that was recovered (R. 357).

prosecution was that the pistol was purchased for defendant and
McGrath, and was used in the robbery (R. 837-38).
5

Stephanie Vert's identification of defendant as the
robber was positive in several respects.

On the day of the

robbery, she told investigating police officers that the robber
had a silver tooth.

When arrested, defendant had a silver tooth

(R. 637, 743-44, 750). About a week after the robbery, Stephanie
quickly identified defendant from a photo array (R. 745, 747).
Several months after that, she viewed a live lineup, and again
unhesitatingly identified defendant as the robber (R. 458-59).*
Martha Vert had more difficulty identifying defendant
from the photo array than did Stephanie.

At the lineup, however,

Martha identified defendant as the person who had examined the
diamond ring on the night before the robbery (R. 347, 510-11).
Jury Selection
Because defendant's "plain error" and "counsel
ineffectiveness" arguments focus on jury selection, a separate
overview of that procedure is appropriate.

Jury selection began

with a panel of twenty-two prospective jurors (R. 151-52).
Initial voir dire covered possible panelist acquaintance with the
parties, court personnel, attorneys, and witnesses (R. 263-67).
The trial court explained the charges, and ascertained that no
panelists had heard about the case against defendant (R. 268).
Predicting a four-day trial, the court asked the
panelists whether they had any personal matters that might
^Represented by counsel, defendant was readily identified
from the lineup, which included seven other similarly-attired,
fairly similar-appearing young men (State's Exhibit 14 at 9, 17,
and photograph Exhibits 15-24, admitted into evidence at R. 75960, and contained in record envelope).

6

conflict with their jury service (R. 268; the pertinent portions
of juror voir dire are reproduced in Appendix II of this brief).
Panelist Frank Barber responded that he was obliged to transport
his wife to physical therapy three times per week (R. 268-69)•
The trial court asked Barber to try to change the therapy
schedule, or to make other transportation arrangements, and
assured Barber that the trial proceedings would recess on time to
accommodate his needs.

Barber responded, "I am not sure that I

could devote my undivided attention to the case under the
circumstances" (R. 269-70).

However, Barber said nothing to

indicate that he would be biased toward either the defense or the
prosecution for any reason.
An engineer employed by a computer company, and who had
no prior jury experience, Barber did sit on the trial jury (R.
156, 281). The original record on appeal does not reveal whether
Barber resolved his schedule conflict.

However, juror Barber

subsequently executed an affidavit stating that he did arrange to
accommodate both the trial schedule and his wife's therapy
appointments.

Reference to that affidavit should not be critical

to the resolution of this appeal.

However, in the event this

Court deems otherwise, this brief is accompanied by a motion to
supplement the record on appeal with Barber's affidavit (the
affidavit and motion are copied at Appendix III of this brief).
The trial court asked the panelists whether they had
ever been subjected to assaults or threats, as would accompany a
robbery; it then expanded this query to include experience as
7

burglary victims (R. 306, 308). Several panelists responded
affirmatively.
Panelist Larry Pike stated, "As a child, our home was
burglarized when we were there" (R. 310). At the time of
defendant's trial, Pike was married, was a master's-level
electrical engineer and the father of two children; he also had
past jury experience (R. 274-75).

Pike indicated no problem when

the trial court asked the crime-experienced panelists whether
they could try this case impartially (R. 310-311).

Pike sat on

the trial jury (R. 156).
Panelist Daniel Heap stated, "I've had my house broke
into before, and our vehicles twice in the last couple of years"
(R. 309-10).

Heap, married with two grown children, was a long-

time "fleet maintenance" worker for Salt Lake County; this was
his first jury duty (R. 276-77).

He also did not report any

possible bias stemming from his experience as a crime victim (R.
309-10), and also sat on defendant's trial jury (R. 156).
Panelist Phyllis Geurts reported, "On two different
occasions we've had somebody walk in our unlocked back door and
take my purse" (R. 309). A self-described "stay-at-home mother,"
Geurts was a first-time jury panelist (R. 278). She was
interviewed in chambers because her husband had been a defense
witness in another criminal case, prosecuted by the same
prosecutor responsible for this trial.

The prosecutor also

believed that he and Mrs. Geurts might have lived in the same
church ward at some time (R. 314-15).
8

Questioned by defense

counsel, Geurts stated that these factors would not affect her
impartiality (R. 315). Geurts did not sit, for she was removed
by a defense peremptory challenge (R. 151).
The only two panelists who had themselves been victims
of violent crime—Alta Ludlow and Debra Trump—were called into
chambers for followup voir dire.5

Besides having been an

assault victim, panelist Ludlow had endured several burglaries
(R. 319-20).

Asked if these experiences would affect her as a

juror, she stated:

"I really don't know.

about it makes me feel kind of sick.

I mean, just talking

I think if somebody tried

to hurt me, or, you know, if I were to put myself in, say, the
victim's circumstances, I might just decide because I know how it
feels" (R. 320). Defense counsel followed up on this comment,
asking Ludlow whether her past experience might "cloud [her]
judgment."

She responded:

"It would be hard.

I'll be honest"

(R. 321). Accordingly, the parties and the court agreed to
strike Ludlow for cause (R. 324).
Panelist Debra Trump, a bank teller, related her
experience as a bank robbery victim (R. 315-16).

Defense counsel

quizzed her about another experience—picking a forgery suspect
from a lineup (R. 317-18).

In light of both experiences, Trump

3

By "victims of violent crime," the State means persons who
had been personally assaulted or threatened. This includes Ms.
Ludlow, who herself had been assaulted (R. 307), and Ms. Trump,
who had been on-duty as a teller during a bank robbery (R. 308).
Panelists Roatcap, Rhodes, Sandberg, and Christensen had friends
or relatives who had been assaulted or robbed (R. 307-09), but
were not themselves victims. Panelists Ludlow, Pickering,
Woodside, Geurts, Heap, and Pike had been victims of burglary
unattended by personal violence (R. 307-10).
9

asserted an ability to try this case impartially (R. 316, 31819).

Rather far down the jury list, however, Trump did not sit

as a juror in defendant's trial (R. 151).
Another panelist at the very end of the list, Gary
Pickering, was excused for cause at defense counsel's request,
without in-chambers voir dire (R. 152, 324). Pickering had been
a burglary victim some years earlier (R. 307-08).

Quite aside

from this, Pickering asserted throughout voir dire that his
beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness compelled him to resist jury duty
(e.g., R. 270, 294). He stated:
won't serve.

"[BJecause of conscience, I

I prefer a jail sentence" (R. 264).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant has proven neither "plain error" nor "counsel
ineffectiveness," such that the jury selection issues that he
raises for the first time on appeal should warrant reversal of
his conviction.

No Utah appellate opinion has held that a trial

court's decision to conduct less-searching voir dire than
defendant now demands would amount, on appeal, to obvious error.
Here the trial court focused its voir dire upon those jurors who
appeared most likely to carry unacceptable biases, and respected
the privacy of others.
court's discretion.

This was a proper exercise of the trial

Even if the trial court might have abused

its discretion, defendant has not shown that he was harmed as a
result, and his "plain error" argument also fails on this basis.
Defense counsel's choice to not more aggressively
interrogate and challenge prospective jurors for cause was
10

permissible under the wide latitude that must be afforded to
trial counsel. Active in the jury selection process, counsel
appropriately removed those jurors whose impartiality was most
questionable.

In his professional judgment, counsel was allowed

to do this either by for-cause or peremptory challenges.
Therefore, "counsel ineffectiveness," like plain error, does not
afford defendant a new trial, based upon jury selection arguments
raised for the first time on appeal.
Defendant's argument that he cannot be convicted of
both robbery and burglary can be summarily rejected.

Properly

framed, his argument is that one of these offenses is a lesser
offense included within the other; a quick review of the elements
of each offense demonstrates that this is not so.
contains an element that is absent in the other.

Each offense
Therefore, it

is entirely appropriate to hold defendant liable for both robbery
and burglary, for these were separate offenses committed during
the same criminal episode.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS WAS FREE FROM
REVERSIBLE "PLAIN ERROR," AND TRIAL COUNSEL
PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY IN JURY SELECTION.
Defendant first argues that the trial jury was
improperly selected, in violation of his constitutional right to
an impartial jury.

In particular, he argues that panelists Frank

Barber, Larry Pike, and Daniel Heap, who all sat on the jury,
should have been questioned more probingly during voir dire, or
11

else challenged for cause.

Panelist Phyllis Geurts, he argues,

should also have been challenged for cause, rather than removed
with a defense peremptory challenge.
Defendant did not object to the now-asserted
improprieties at trial, and jury selection errors are normally
waived on appeal absent a timely trial court objection.

See Utah

R. Crim. P. 18(c); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988)
(jury selection issue waived under Rule 18(c)); State v. Miller.
674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (same, under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d)
timely objection rule).6

On appeal, represented by new counsel,

defendant seeks relief from his jury selection waiver under
either the "plain error" or "ineffective counsel" doctrines.
These arguments will be considered in turn.
A.

Absence of "Plain Error."
The "plain error" exception to the waiver rule has been

fully explained in State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989), State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), and State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah
6

Rule 18(c)(l)(ii) states in part, "The challenge to the
[jury] panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn . . . "
(emphasis added). Rule 18(c)(2) states in part: "A challenge to
an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to
try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it
to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the
evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules
relating to challenges to a panel and the hearings thereon shall
apply" (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that under Rules 18 and 20, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, "defense attorneys are not required to object
to the omissions of the trial courts" (Br. of Appellant at 16).
This astonishing proposition finds no support in the cited rules,
flies in the face of "black letter" legal principle, and will not
be further addressed in this brief.
12

App. 1991).

The plain error exception contains two elements:

First, the error must be "obvious," compelling a conclusion that
the trial court should have known that it was committing error.
Second, the error must be "harmful" or "prejudicial;" that is,
there must be a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the
trial outcome would have been more favorable to the appellant.
Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35.7 Defendant has not demonstrated the
existence of either element here.
1*

No "Obvious" Error.
Juror Frank Barber

Under plain error analysis, defendant's argument that
"[j]uror Barber was incompetent" (Br. of appellant at 7) must be
restated as "juror Barber was obviously incompetent," and
therefore should not have been seated on the jury.

Defendant's

argument fails, for he misunderstands the term "incompetent."
"Competence" and "incompetence" to serve as a juror are
defined in Utah Code Ann. S§ 78-46-7 and 78-46-8 (1992), within
Utah's Jury Selection and Service Act (reproduced in Appendix I
of this brief).8

Under section 78-46-7, competence for jury

7

In Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, this Court identified
"plain error" and "exceptional circumstances" as distinct
doctrines that may afford relief from the waiver (or "procedural
default") rule. The State prefers to view both plain error and
"counsel ineffectiveness" as subcategories under "exceptional
circumstances." Both doctrines, after all, are "exceptions" to
the general waiver rule.
8

The Jury Selection and Service Act was amended, effective
after defendant's March 1992 trial. The amendments relating to
the arguments raised in this appeal appear to be largely in
arrangement of the various provisions rather than in substantive
content. See Utah Code Ann. S 78-46-7, -8, -10, -12, -15 (Supp.
13

service consists of citizenship, age, residency, and English
language requirements.

Section 78-46-8 declares that convicted

felons, active duty military personnel, and persons with mental
and physical disabilities are not competent to serve.

Juror

competence, therefore, addresses basic, minimal qualifications
for jury service.
Competence does not, as defendant seems to argue, deal
with juror "bias."

Bias is covered by distinctive provisions of

Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As summarized in
Rule 18(e)(14), bias refers to "a state of mind [that] exists on
the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging . .
." (emphasis added).

Bias, then, is a mental state favoring one

party over the other.

A challenge for cause will lie against a

juror who is either incompetent or is biased (or both), see Rule
18(e) (1), (2), (14). However, incompetence and bias are not
overlapping characteristics.
Juror Barber was not obviously incompetent, such that
the trial court erred in failing, on its own motion, to remove
him for cause.

Barber only stated that he had a schedule

conflict, posed by his wife's physical therapy appointments, that
might cause him to be less than fully attentive at trial (R.
270).

This clearly does not amount to a "mental disability," a

1992). For clarity, the provisions actually in force at the time
of defendant's trial are used in this brief.
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form of incompetence under the Jury Selection and Service Act.
Well-educated, and employed as an engineer (R. 281), Barber was
not "disabled" by his schedule conflict.9
Further, by its terms, the Jury Selection and Service
Act contemplates that "mental disability" is generally raised by
the prospective juror, not by a party.

Even then, the trial

court is not bound to remove the juror; instead, the court may
require "a physician's certificate verifying the disability."
See section 78-46-8(c).

Accordingly, the trial court in this

case was in no way required to view Juror Barber as "incompetent"
under the controlling law, and to remove him for cause based upon
the possible distracting influence of his schedule conflict.
Even though Barber professed an inability to devote
full attention to defendant's trial, given his need to care for
his wife, the trial court could not possibly predict which party
would be prejudiced by that distraction.

Absent any for-cause

challenge, the trial court could quite reasonably presume that
the risk of prejudice—that is, the risk that Barber would be
biased—was equally borne between the parties.

Therefore, the

court properly chose not to interfere with both parties'
decisions, implicit in their lack of any challenge to him, that
Barber was a desirable juror.
9

Most of the cases cited by defendant in support of his
"incompetence" argument, as he describes them (Br. of Appellant
at 11-12), uphold trial court discretion to remove certain
jurors. The cases that seemingly command removal involve more
serious disabilities such as physical or mental impairment, poor
hearing, inability to understand English, and sleeping—factors
not present in this case.
15

If there was any legitimate reason to remove Barber
from jury service, that reason lay in section 78-46-15 of the
Jury Selection and Service Act.

That provision allows trial

courts, at their discretion, to excuse prospective jurors on
grounds of "undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public
necessity . . . ."

However, Rule 18(h), Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure, states that "[a] statutory exemption from service as a
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and is not a ground
for challenge for cause" (emphasis added).

Therefore, defendant

cannot complain of the failure to grant Barber a "hardship"
exemption; under Rule 18(h), he has no standing to do so.
Finally, it now appears, based upon the post-trial
affidavit of Mr. Barber, that he did in fact resolve the conflict
posed by his responsibility toward his wife, as requested by the
trial court.

This fact need not be supplemented into the record

if this Court agrees with the legal analysis already presented.
However, if this Court rejects that analysis, the State asks it
to consider Barber's affidavit, in support of the argument that
it was not "obvious error" to seat him on this jury.
On no legitimate basis, then, has defendant shown
"obvious" error in the trial court's decision to seat Barber on
the trial jury.

Barber was neither incompetent, biased, nor

otherwise obviously subject to dismissal from jury service.
Jurors Larry Pike and Daniel Heap
Defendant argues that because jurors Pike and Heap had
both been burglary victims (R. 309-10), an "inference of bias"
16

attached to each.

His argument relies upon State v. Woollev, 810

P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

In

Woollev, a panel majority held that an "inference of bias" arises
when a prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar to
the one being tried.

810 P.2d at 443 (quoting State v. Cobb, 774

P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989)).

The majority then held that under

such circumstances, "the trial judge must probe the juror to
insure that he or she can decide the case impartially despite the
past victimization . . .." .Id., at 444 (emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing language, defendant's argument
is that the trial court committed "obvious" error when it failed
to thoroughly "probe" jurors Pike and Heap about their past
experience as burglary victims, even though no such "probing" was
requested by counsel. While Woollev can be read to support
defendant's argument, there are several reasons why this Court
should not do so.
First, Woollev was a case where the crime-victim jury
panelists were challenged by trial counsel.

810 P.2d at 441-42.

Woollev thus arose in the traditional manner:

the jury selection

issue had been properly preserved for appeal.

Thus despite the

strong criticism that it levelled at the trial court, the Woollev
majority did not hold that the failure to more fully "probe" the
victim-panelists would have been "obvious" error, even absent a
timely challenge.10

In fact, in a post-Woollev decision, State

10

ln State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), also relied
upon by defendant, the supreme court, exercising its "supervisory
role over the lower courts," "remind[ed] trial judges to take
17

v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah App. 1992), this Court
implicitly rejected an "obvious error" argument where the
defendant raised jury selection issues for the first time on
appeal, as does this defendant.
Next, the Woollev majority discerned "no good policy
reason not to require probing to clarify any possible prejudice
when fundamental rights are at stake."

810 P.2d at 444. One

such reason, however, was acknowledged after Woollev, and before
this defendant's trial.

In State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah

App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), this Court
affirmed "the trial court's duty to protect juror privacy."

818

P.2d at 559 (internal quotations omitted, quoting State v. Ball,
685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)).

It was therefore within the

trial court's sound discretion here to respect the privacy of
jurors Pike and Heap, and not "probe" them about their past
burglaries.n
care to adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible
issues of bias, including press coverage." .Id. at 797-98.
Unfortunately, by not "commenting upon the effectiveness or the
wisdom of the process of voir dire" that had been conducted in
James, id. at 797, or even describing the process, the supreme
court gave no guidance about what constitutes "adequate" versus
"inadequate" voir dire. James, then, is a poor source, if it is
any source at all, for an "obvious error" ruling in this case.
n

The Woollev majority recognized the varying formulations
of the discretion afforded to trial courts in jury selection—
including "sound discretion" and "some deference." 810 P.2d at
442 n.2. In Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174, this Court identified a
"broad discretion" standard. The governing voir dire rule, Utah
R. Crim. P. 18(b), remains couched in discretionary language
(trial court "may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper . . ."
(emphasis added)). If courts now "must probe" certain
prospective jurors more deeply, it seems that Rule 18(b) should
18

Additionally, Pike and Heap did not respond when the
trial court asked the general question, immediately upon
identification of the victim-panelists, whether "anything" might
cause them to be biased (R. 310-11).

Because Pike and Heap thus

tacitly asserted that their past experiences would not prejudice
them against defendant, no "obvious error" should be found in the
trial court's determination that they could in fact "well and
truly try the matter in issue," as they were sworn to do under
Rule 18(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, the trial court did individually examine the
prospective jurors who had been direct victims of violent crimes,
i.e., assault and robbery.

One of those victims, Alta Ludlow,

was properly excused for cause upon her admission of likely
resulting bias (R. 320). (The other, Debra Trump, did not
require a for-cause challenge—if indeed such challenge might
have been granted over her assertion of impartiality (R. 318-19),
for she was too far down the jury list to be selected.)

By

focusing voir dire scrutiny upon those panelists who had been
directly assaulted—and therefore more severely traumatized—as
crime victims, the court showed that it knew how to, and indeed
did, properly exercise its discretion in jury selection.

There

was no "obvious error" in its decision to not "probe" the victimpanelists who had been burglarized, but not directly assaulted.

be amended, via the Utah Supreme Court's rulemaking process, see
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 11-101, to reflect that requirement.
19

Finally, the notion that prospective jurors are
"inferentially biased," because of past victimization in similar
crimes, ought to be seriously questioned.

That judicially-

created inference contradicts an express policy statement in
Utah's Jury Selection and Service Act:
It is the policy of this state that persons
selected for jury or grand jury service be
selected at random from a fair cross section of
the population of the area served by the court,
and that all qualified citizens have the
opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be
considered for service and have the obligation to
serve when summoned for that purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-2 (1992).
Courts should not circumvent the expressed legislative
intention that "all qualified citizens" have the right and the
duty to serve on criminal juries, by imposing an unproven
"inference of bias" upon those who have themselves been crime
victims.12

In light of section 78-46-2, that practice violates

Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution (Appendix I of this
brief), an express "distribution of powers" declaration.

It also

re-victimizes law-abiding citizens who have been crime victims,
by eroding their jury service right.

12

Accordingly, the practice

The State is aware of no empirical proof that past
experience as a crime victim necessarily affects a citizen's
ability to act as an impartial juror in a similar but unrelated
case. Compare Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-45, 98 S. Ct.
1029, 1034-41 (1978) (holding that jury must have at least six
members, to assure a constitutionally-required impartial jury in
nonpetty criminal trials, after reviewing scientific studies of
group decisionmaking process). Cf. Davis v. State, 93 Md. App.
89, 611 A.2d 1008, 1010 (criticising "tall tales" by "storied
masters of trial advocacy," championing expansive juror voir
dire), cert, granted,
Md.
, 616 A.2d 1286 (1992).
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should not be sanctioned, especially not by finding "obvious
error" in decisions not to intrusively "probe" such citizens, or
exclude them from jury service.
Panelist Phyllis Geurts
Defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to exclude
panelist Geurts from the jury (R. 151). Utah's appellate courts
have held that "[i]t is prejudicial error to compel a party to
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who
should have been removed for cause." Woollev, 810 P.2d at 440
(citing authority).

Here, however, defendant was not "compelled"

to remove Geurts with a peremptory challenge, for he raised no
for-cause challenge against her.
Further, one potential problem with panelist Geurts was
the fact that her husband had once been a defense witness,
adverse to the same prosecutor who represented the State in this
trial (R. 314-15).

Thus while her experience as a burglary

victim yields an unproven "inference" that Geurts might have been
predisposed against defendant, her husband's past adverse role
against the prosecutor might equally have predisposed Geurts
against the State. With these facts known, plus Geurts's shared
religious affiliation with the prosecutor, the trial court did
not commit "obvious" error when it did not take matters into its
own hands, and excuse Geurts for cause.
2.

No Likelihood of a More Favorable Result.

If this Court agrees that no "obvious" error occurred
in the jury selection process, it need proceed no further.
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Instead, it can hold that defendant is not entitled to relief
from the trial-level waiver of his jury selection arguments, for
he has not proven the "obviousness" element of "plain error."

In

Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 36, the Utah Supreme Court did just this,
in disposing of an evidentiary argument first raised on appeal.
Even if some "obvious" error in jury selection were
found by this Court, defendant makes no effort to demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable trial verdict, absent
such error.

Because it is clearly his burden to make such a

showing of prejudice, see Verde, 770 P.2d at 122, his "plain
error" argument also fails on this basis.
Apparently defendant wants this Court to declare that
the trial jury, composed of eight law-abiding citizens, who all
asserted an ability to try his case fairly, was nevertheless
biased, in violation of his constitutional right to an impartial
jury.

U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. All of

those jurors, however, were passed for cause by trial counsel and
the trial court, who observed the jurors first-hand.

Neither

this Court nor defendant's appellate counsel enjoys that
"advantaged view."

See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177

(Utah App. 1992) (declining to find plain error in jury
selection, where the trial court and the parties had advantaged
view of actual jurors).

Accordingly, this Court ought not set

aside the trial-level judgment, shared by court and counsel, that
an impartial jury had been seated.
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Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
an impartial jury is achieved through the collective mix of a
group of jurors.

Each individual juror, it is understood, will

hold certain biases:
[T]he smaller the group, the less likely it is to
overcome the biases of its members to obtain an
accurate result. When individual and group
decisionmaking were compared, it was seen that
groups performed better because prejudices of
individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and
objectivity resulted
Because juries
frequently face complex problems laden with value
choices, the benefits are important and should be
retained. In particular, the counterbalancing of
various biases is critical to the accurate
application of the common sense of the community
to the facts of any given case.
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34, 98 S. Ct. 1029, 1035-36
(1978) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

In other words, an

impartial jury is not achieved by "ferreting out" all possible
bias from every individual juror.13

Instead, it is achieved by

recognizing that each individual juror holds some biases, and
that unless extreme, such biases will be counterbalanced by other
jurors' biases.

13

Ballew (1978), in the State's view, supersedes the
language in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S. Ct. 546
(1965), quoted in Br. of Appellant at 14, suggesting that every
individual juror must be free of all bias. Turner also involved
improper jury-witness contact, a factor absent here.
The "ferreting" metaphor is interesting, derived from
ferret, a "form of the Old World polecat, often trained to hunt
rats or rabbits," or a "weasellike mammal." Webster's II New
Riverside University Dictionary 472 (Houghton Mifflin 1988). It
calls to mind a jury of rats and rabbits, set upon by polecats
and weasels, and fosters the cynical view that lay citizens and
attorneys commonly hold toward each other.
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Utah felony juries already exceed the federal
impartiality standard, based upon the number of required jurors:
Ballew sets a minimum of six jurors for nonpetty criminal juries.
435 U.S. at 243-45, 98 S. Ct. at 1041. However, Article I,
section 10 of the Utah Constitution explicitly mandates that
noncapital felonies be tried to an eight-member jury.

Obviously,

this enhances the bias-counterbalancing effect of the group
decision process in Utah courts.
In apparently arguing that this trial jury was not
impartial, defendant therefore erroneously focuses upon only
three of the eight jurors: Barber, Pike, and Heap.

Even if

those three jurors might have had some slight bias against
defendant—stemming from schedule conflicts, past crime
victimization, or whatever, this says absolutely nothing about
the other five jurors.

In light of Ballew and the higher Utah

standard for minimum jury size, it is entirely appropriate to
assume that at least some of those five jurors held defensefavorable biases, counterbalancing any possible defense-adverse
biases held by their three colleagues.
Defendant also attempts to prove jury bias by arguing
that one of his peremptory challenges was wasted on panelist
Geurts, who he claims should have been excused for cause.

This

attempt is grounded in the following pronouncement of the Utah
Supreme Court:
It is no excuse to say that the verdict was
unanimous and since six of the eight jurors could
find a verdict, the error [in failing to remove a
juror for cause] was harmless. By exercising one
24

of their peremptory challenges upon this
prospective juror, plaintiffs had only two
remaining. The juror which remained because the
plaintiffs had no challenge to remove him may have
been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will
upon them.
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975).

This long-

established rule of automatic prejudice, see Woollev, 810 P.2d at
440, was supported by no cited authority in the Crawford opinion.
Worse, in establishing the automatic prejudice rule,
the Utah Supreme Court overlooked or ignored its own longstanding
precedents

"This contention that prejudice is presumed from an

erroneous ruling in a challenge for cause when all peremptory
challenges have been exhausted was raised by appellants in the
case of State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 426, 126 P. 286, 291
[(1912)], and was overruled."

Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co.,

112 Utah 189, 196-99, 186 P.2d 293, 297 (1947) (emphasis added).
Accord State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973);
State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 P.2d 563 (1924).

The Van Wagoner

and Thorne opinions were supported by extensive analysis and
citation to authorities, and supported the principle that a
convicted defendant who complains of a biased jury must support
that complaint with proof.

See Thorne, 41 Utah at 426-27, 126 P.

at 291-92. Accord Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S. Ct.
2273, 2277 (1988).
Seen in this light, the Crawford v. Manning automatic
prejudice rule appears very unsound.
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The State hopes to persuade

the supreme court to overrule it.1A

In any event, the rule's

application should be strictly limited to those cases where a
for-cause juror challenge is made in the trial court, preserving
the issue for appellate review.

"More than mere speculation is

required to support a charge of lack of jury impartiality on
appeal."

State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Utah 1991).

As

fanciful speculation, at best, of prejudicial jury selection
error, the Crawford rule should never be applied in a case like
this one, where no trial-level, for-cause juror challenge has
preserved the issue for appellate review.13
In sum, defendant has proven neither obvious error nor
resulting prejudice to him, in the trial court's handling of the
jury selection process. Accordingly, he has not established

14

The Crawford rule recently led to reversal of a capital
homicide conviction in State v. Young, No. 890424, slip op. at
17-18, 99-101 (Utah March 17, 1993). There three justices found
"clear error" in the trial court's refusal to remove one juror
for cause, see id. at 99, where a peremptory challenge had been
used to remove the juror. More stringent scrutiny of jury
selection may be justified in capital cases. Even so, one of the
Young majority justices commented that "in voting to reverse
defendant's conviction, no member of this court has suggested
that he is innocent of the appalling crime of which he was
convicted or that the commission of that crime by one with
defendant's past record of violent crime cannot be punished by
death." Jji. at 134 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting).
15

The Crawford "hawk amid seven doves" metaphor is also
curious. It implies that litigants are somehow entitled to a
jury composed solely of "doves" who, like their pigeon cousins,
might be trained or conditioned to perform certain simple tricks.
"Hawks," meanwhile—alert, independent, and perceptive, are to be
avoided. This seems cynical and inappropriate, particularly in a
democratic society composed of both "doves" and "hawks:" both
groups should be represented on juries.
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"plain error" in that process, and is not entitled to a reversal
of his conviction.
B.

Effective Assistance of Counsel.
Defendant alternatively argues that his trial-level

waiver of jury selection issues should be overcome by the
doctrine of "ineffective assistance of counsel," as set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
By waiving deeper voir dire "probing," and not raising more forcause juror challenges, defendant argues, his trial counsel
performed in a prejudicially deficient fashion.
This Court has recognized that "plain error" and
"counsel ineffectiveness" arguments, raised for the first time on
appeal, share "a common standard."

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d

170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
124 n.15 (Utah 1989)).

Like plain error, counsel ineffectiveness

entails a two-element, "error plus resulting harm" test.
The "error" element of counsel ineffectiveness is
framed as "deficient performance."

To prove this element, the

defendant must overcome a "strong presumption" of competent
performance, and prove that trial counsel seriously blundered, in
a manner that falls outside "the wide latitude counsel must have
in making tactical decisions."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.

The "resulting harm" or "prejudice" element is the same as for
plain error:

the defendant must show that but for counsel

blunder(s), there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict
would have been more favorable.

Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174. As
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with plain error, the defendant must normally prove both
elements.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2066,

2069; Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 & n.2.
Because the plain error and counsel ineffectiveness
tests so closely resemble one another, the State's plain error
analysis also applies to counsel ineffectiveness.

Accordingly,

the State incorporates that analysis, without repetition, into
its argument that trial counsel performed effectively on
defendant's behalf.

As follows, the State adds some additional

observations in support of this argument, and in defense of trial
counsel's performance.
1.

No Deficient Counsel Performance.

Trial counsel did not blunder his way through jury
selection.

Instead, the record reflects that he was fully

involved in voir dire, and reasonably exercised his juror
challenge rights.
Counsel himself questioned the panelists, stressing
their duty to acquit defendant if the "beyond a reasonable" doubt
standard were not met (R. 312). Similarly, during in-chambers
voir dire, counsel followed up on panelist Geurts's indirect
contacts with the prosecutor (R. 315), panelist Trump's
experiences as a robbery victim and a lineup witness (R. 317-19),
and panelist Ludlow's experience as a victim of both violent
crime and burglary (R. 320-21).

After voir dire, counsel's

consensus agreement with the court and prosecutor, to remove
panelist Ludlow for cause, was appropriately based upon Ludlow's
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admission that her impartiality was doubtful (R. 321, 324). See
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 173 (counsel and court cooperatively
decided juror challenges; ineffectiveness claim rejected).
Counsel was not required to aggressively "probe" every
juror who had any sort of experience as a crime victim, as his
present counsel advocates.

See Jones, 823 P.2d at 1063 ("This

Court will not review counsel's tactical decisions simply because
another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a
different course").

Nor was he required to challenge those

jurors, either for cause or peremptorily, because counsel need
not raise every available objection in order to perform
competently.

See, e.g., State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1066-68

(Utah 1988) (no deficient performance where "it was conceivable"
that objections were foregone as part of strategy).

Counsel also

had professional latitude to remove certain panelists with
peremptory challenges, rather than through for-cause challenges.
See Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 176-77 (counsel permissibly waived one
peremptory challenge, and used others to remove three panelists
assailed "for cause" on appeal).
In fact, aggressive "probing" of prospective jurors
might itself cause the very harm it purports to prevent, by
annoying the panelists and prejudicing them against the "probing"
counsel's case.
here.

The prosecutor engaged in only minimal "probing"

Trial defense counsel also limited his voir dire, except

in those instances when bias seemed most likely, and thereby
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limited the likelihood of actually causing harmful jury bias.
This was competent performance.
As a policy matter, this Court should hold a very hard
line against overcoming trial-level waiver of legal issues via
"ineffective counsel" appellate arguments.

Regarding jury

selection, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to
find deficient performance in trial counsel's decision to seat a
juror who affirmatively declared a bias in favor of the
prosecution.

See Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 444-45 (Texas

Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (juror was an ex-narcotics officer who
knew the narcotics-offense defendant, and stated, "I couldn't be
impartial, I'm saying").

The Texas court determined that some

conceivable tactic might have underpinned this unusual decision;
it also held that jury selection is subject to the same waiver
principles as other legal issues.

840 S.W.2d at 445-46. The

Texas court's holding also supports the principle that trial
counsel ought not be permitted to plant the seeds of a later
reversal, by appearing to perform "deficiently."
This Court alluded to such a policy concern in
Ellifritz, 815 P.2d at 177. Citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d
155, 158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct.
3720 (1990), with respect to plain error, the Court observed that
the practice of "invited error" would be supported unless
stringent standards for appellate consideration of such claims
were maintained.

A similar policy concern is evident in

Strickland, where the United States Supreme Court, expressing the
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"profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings,"
reiterated that a showing of counsel ineffectiveness must be
powerfully made.

466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

No such powerful showing has been made here.

This

Court may not like the jury selection approach that trial counsel
took in this case.

Nevertheless, this Court should recognize

that counsel's approach was permissible, under the wide latitude
that must be afforded to him.
2.

No Resulting Harm.

Apparently conceding that he cannot affirmatively prove
that trial counsel's alleged jury selection blunders harmed him,
defendant asks this Court to relieve him of his normal burden
under Strickland, and to presume prejudice (Br. of Appellant at
21).

This would be a mistake.
Strickland sets forth but two instances in which

counsel blunder must give rise to a presumption of prejudice.
Prejudice is presumed when counsel assistance is effectively
denied altogether, or when the state itself interferes with
counsel's ability to function.
2067.

466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at

There is a "more limited" presumption of prejudice when

counsel has a conflict of interest with the defendant.
(quotations and citations omitted).
happened here:

Id.

None of these things

trial counsel was unimpeded by the State, and

acted solely on defendant's behalf.
In urging this Court to expand the exceptions to the
normal rule that defendants must affirmatively prove that
31

counsel's blunder caused harm, defendant relies upon Presley v.
State, 750 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 975, 109
S. Ct. 514 (1988).

Presley involved counsel's failure to

challenge, either for cause or peremptorily, a juror who clearly
stated that he would be "partial to the state."

750 S.W.2d at

604, 607. No such admittedly biased persons sat on the jury that
tried this defendant.

Thus Presley, not controlling in any

event, would not support a presumption of prejudice here, even if
it were held that counsel unreasonably failed to further probe or
challenge certain jurors.
People v. Wagner, 104 A.D.2d 457, 479 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App.
Div. 2 Dept. 1984), also relied on by defendant, is a case where
nine of twelve jurors had close police contacts, the trial turned
on officer testimony, and counsel failed to investigate those
contacts.

104 A.D.2d at 68. This error, resulting in a jury

said to resemble "a miniature police force," id., was but one of
many "derelictions" of trial counsel. JEd. at 69.

Similarly,

Mason v. State, 289 Ark. 299, 712 S.W.2d 275 (1986), involved
multiple counsel blunders not limited to jury selection.

Neither

opinion suggests, however, that the reviewing court applied any
presumption of resulting harm.

Wagner and Mason, then, do not

help defendant.
Application of a presumption of prejudice to counsel
miscues in jury selection would also be poor policy.

There may

be any number of other cases in which, upon review of cold
transcripts, belated attacks on counsel's jury selection
32

performance might be made.

By presuming harm in such cases, the

waiver rule—which clearly applies to jury selection, see Utah R.
Crim. P. 18(c)(2), would effectively be swallowed by its "counsel
ineffectiveness" exception.

Instead, the finality of trial court

judgments should be supported, by upholding the waiver rule
against jury selection challenges that are raised for the first
time on appeal.16
The burden to show actual harm from counsel blunders in
jury selection, then, properly rests with defendant, as does the
burden of proving that actual blunders were made.

Having failed

to carry either burden, defendant's allegation of trial counsel
ineffectiveness should be rejected.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED BURGLARY.
Defendant makes another argument, also unpreserved by
trial-level objection, that he could not be convicted of both
16

Sounder Utah cases finding reversible error in preserved
jury selection issues have been those in which the challenged
jurors acknowledged actual bias. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 734
P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (two jurors admitted that they would be
affected by close ties to murder victim's family); State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984) (juror expressed bias for
prosecution and stated, "In essence, I would prefer not to be
here"); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (two
jurors "expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration" as
victims of crimes similar to that being tried); Jenkins v.
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 535-36 (Utah 1981) (juror admitted
tendency to believe defendant physician in malpractice suit);
State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 1980) (two jurors agreed
that police testimony could be relied upon "to the utmost");
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975) (juror in
wrongful death action expressed "strong feelings" about trying to
recover money for the death of another). Again here, no such
admittedly-biased jurors were allowed to sit.
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aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary.

This argument,

essentially that the burglary was a lesser included offense
within the robbery, should be summarily rejected.
This Court need consider neither plain error nor
counsel ineffectiveness as bases for overcoming defendant's
trial-level waiver of this argument.

Had defendant objected to

either the dual charges or the dual convictions in the trial
court, the objection would have been correctly denied.

Under

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1990), robbery includes the element
of "taking of personal property" through force or fear.

The act

of "taking" is not part of the offense of burglary.17
Burglary, however, defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202 (1990), does include an element that is not part of the
robbery definitions

the act of "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in a

building" with criminal intent.

The Utah Supreme Court has

squarely rejected defendant's argument that "remaining" is not an
"act" for the purposes of the burglary statute.

See State v.

Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing
1988).

Accordingly, once defendant wore out his welcome in the

Vert home by threatening and handcuffing Stephanie Vert within
the home, he committed burglary.

17

See id.

Then, when he took

The "aggravating" element for aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary is quite similar, that is, the possession or
use of a "dangerous weapon" in the course of the offense. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-203, 76-6-302 (1990). Therefore, the State
analyzes only the simple robbery and simple burglary statutes for
the purpose of this argument.
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property from the home, an act accomplished with the aid of that
threat and assault, defendant committed robbery.
In short, the offenses of aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary, while overlapping, each contain an element
not found within the other.

This makes them separate criminal

offenses, for which defendant was properly tried and convicted,
even though they were committed during a "single criminal
episode," under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990).

See State v.

Eichler, 584 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1978) (robbery and kidnapping
during same episode: both convictions affirmed); State v. Jones,
13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 (1962) (burglary and theft (then
larceny) during same episode: both convictions affirmed); Duran
v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) (same).

Defendant's

argument to the contrary, which ignores controlling legal
precedent, is therefore meritless.
CONCLUSION
Our adversary system of justice did not fail this
defendant.

He received a fair trial, and the convictions

resulting from that trial should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^*=> day of March, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHYv »
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX I
Utah Jury Selection and Service Act
(copied from unannotated Utah Code, 1991),
and
Utah Constitution, Article V, section 1

JUDICIAL CODE

429

request of the court of die ether state a certified copy
of the transcript of any court record and other documents mentioned in Section 7845c-21.
mo
7845c-23. Foreign countries — Application irf
general policies.
The general policies of this act extend to the international area. The provisions of this act relating to
the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of
ether states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody
rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations
if reasonable notioe and opportunity to be heard were
given to all affected persons.
iseo
7845c-24. Priority on eoort calendar.
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding
which raises a question of existence or exercise of
jurisdiction under this act the ease shall be given calendar priority and handled expeditiously
tun

Section
7846-11.

7846-13.

18 4f» j I

7846-15.
7846-16.

7&45c-2&. Notices — Orders to appear — Man7846-17.
s e r of serviceCD Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty
upon the court to notify a party or court of a particu- 7846-18.
lar fact or action, such notification may be accomplished by the clerk of the court or a party to the 7846-19.
action upon order of the court
7846-20
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to appear before the court in accordance with the terms of 7846-21.
this act anatf include Jegaf and sufficient service of
process in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise ordered for good cause 7846-22
shown.
iseo 7846-23.
7&-45c-». Short title.
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act"
iseo
CHAPTER 46d
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION
(Repealed by Laws 1988, eh. 1, I 407.)
7&45d-l to 78454-13. Repealed.
PART V
JURORS
CHAPTER 46
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section
78-46-1.
78-46-2
78-46-3.
78-46-4.
7846-5.
7846-6.
7846-7.
7846-8.
7846-9.
7846-10.

Short title.
Jurors and grand jurors selected from
random cross section — Opportunity
and obligation to serve.
Discrimination prohibited.
Definitions.
Number of trial jurors.
Alternate trial jurors — Selection—Duties and function.
Parsons competent to serve as jurors.
Determination on juror qualification —
Persons not competent to aerve as ju-

78-46-4
Master jury wheel — Selection of names
to put in jury wheel — Certification of
Drawing prospective juror names from
master wheel — Juror qualification
form — Content — Completion —
Penalties for failure to complete or
misrepresentation — Joint jury wheel
for court authorised.
Drawing juror panels — Notice to jurors
— Procedure when shortage of jurors
drawn — Public inspection of names
drawn and content of qualification
forms — Exception.
Qualified prospective jurors not exempt
from jury service.
Excuse from jury service.
Jury not selected in conformity with
chapter — Procedure to challenge —
Relief available — Exclusive remedy.
Preservation of records and papers by
county clerk.
Compensation and travel expenses of jurors.
limitations on jury service
Penalties for failure to appear or complete jury service.
Employer not to discharge or threaten
employee for jury eervice — Criminal
penalty — Civil action by employee.
Repealed.
Court administrator's duties and responaibilities.

7846-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may I
"Jury Selection and Service Act."

1 u\

In
i w%

7846-2. Jurors and grand jurors selected from
random cross section — Opportunity
and obligation to aerve.
It is the policy erf this state that persons selected for
jury or grand jury service be selected at random from
a fair cross section of the population of the area
eerved by the court, and that all qualified citizens
havts the opportunity in accordance with this chapter
to b* considered for service and have the obligation to
aerve when summoned for that purpose.
isso
7846-8. Discrimination prohibited.
A dtisen shall not be excluded or exemptfromjury
service on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.
itrs

78464. Definition*.
(1) "Clerk" or "clerk ofthe court" means the person
ao designated by title and includes any deputy clerk.
(2) "Court* means trial courts, and includes, when
the context requires, any judge or justice of the court.
(8) ''Grand jury" means a body of seven persons
selected from the citizens of a particular county bea m a court of competent jurisdiction and sworn to
inquire into public offenses committed or triable
within the county.
(4) "Jury" means a body of persons temporarily selected from the citizens of a particular county inRepealed.
vested with power to present and indict a personfora
Master list maintained by county clerk public offense, or to try a question of fact.
— Public examination —- Lists used in
(6) "Jury wheel" means any physical device or eleccompiling master Mat available to tronic systemforthe storage of the names or identifycounty clerk.
ing numbers of prospective jurors.

78-46-5
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(6) "Master jury wheel* means the jury wheel in
which are placed names or identifying numbers of
prospective jurors taken from the master list pursuant to this a c t
(7) "Master list* means the primary and secondary
source lists as prescribed by the Judicial Council under Section 78-46-10.
(8) "Official register of voters" means the book
maintained for each voting district containing the
names of persons registered to vote within the voting
district in the most recent general election.
(9) "Qualified jury wheel* means the jury wheel in
which are placed the names or identifying numbers of
prospective jurors whose names are drawn at random
from the master jury wheel and are determined to be
qualified to serve as jurors.
(10) "Trial jury* means a body of persons selected
from the citizens of a particular county before a court
or officer of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to try
and determine by verdict a question of fact
isss
7 M 6 4 . Number of trial jurore(1) A trial jury in capital cases shall consist of
twelve jurors.
(2) A trial jury in district court in noncapital criminal or civil cases shall consist of eight jurors; provided
that in misdemeanor and civil cases the jury may
consist of any number less than eight upon which the
parties may agree in open court
(3) A trial jury in a circuit or justice court shall
consist of six jurors in a class A misdemeanor trial,
and in other criminal or civil cases the trial jury snail
consist of four jurors or of any number less than four
upon which the parties may agree in open court
(4) A trial jury in a juvenile court shall consist of
four jurors,
ISTS
78-4*4. Alternate trial jurors — Selection —
Duties and function,
(1) At the commencement of a felony trial when
the court believes the trial may be long, the judge
may cause an entry to that effect in the minutes, and
immediately after the jury is impanelled and sworn,
direct the calling of one additional juror to be known
as "alternate juror.*
(2) The alternate juror shall be drawn from the
same source, in the same manner and have the same
qualifications, be subject to the same examination
and challenges as the jurors already sworn; provided,
that each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge to the alternate juror.
(3) The alternate juror shall be seated near, and
have equal facilities for seeing and hearing the proceedings and shall take the same oath as the jurors
already selected. The alternate juror must attend the
trial at all times in company with the other jurors
and shall obey the orders and be bound by the admonition of the court at each adjournment If the regular
jurors are ordered to be kept in the custody of the
sheriff during the trial, the alternate shall be kept
with the other jurors, and, except as herein provided,
shall be discharged when the case is submitted to the
jury.
(4) If a juror dies or becomes ill and is unable to
perform juror duties prior to the final submission of
the case to the jury, the court may order the alternate
juror to assume the juror's place in the jury box. The
alternate juror is subject to the same rules and regulations as the original jurors.
lsrt
78-46-7. Persons competent to serve a s jurors.
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if the
person is:
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(a) a citisen of the United States;
(b) over the age of 18 years;
(c) a resident of the county; and
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the English language.
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or secondary locations for the circuit court, a person is not
competent to serve as a juror in cases involving the
violation of a municipal ordinance unless the person,
in addition to meeting the requirements listed in
Subsection (1), resides within the municipality whose
ordinance is alleged to have been violated or, in the
case of a municipality with a population of fewer than
3,000 persons, resides within 15 miles of the municipality.
IMS
78-46-8. Determination o n juror qualification —
Persons not competent to serve as jurors.
(1) The court, on its own initiative or when requested by a prospective juror, shall determine
whether the prospective juror is disqualified from
jury service. The court shall base its decision on the
information provided on the juror qualification form,
or by interview with the prospective juror or other
competent evidence. The clerk shall enter the court's
determination on the juror qualification form and on
the alphabetical list of names drawn from the master
jury wheel.
(2) The following persons are not competent to
serve as jurors:
(a) a person who has been convicted of a felony;
(b) a person serving on active duty in the military service of the United States;
(c) a person who is not capable because of
physical or mental disability of rendering satisfactory jury service. Any person who claims this
disqualification may be required to submit a physician's certificate verifying the disability and
the certifying physician is subject to inquiry by
the court at its discretion; or
(d) a person who does not meet the requirements of Section 78-46-7.
ISTI
78-46-9. Repealed.

isss

78-46-10. Master list maintained b y county
clerk — Public examination — Lists
used in compiling master list available
to county clerk.
(1) The county clerk for each county shall maintain
the master list, which shall be open to the public for
examination.
(2) The person having custody, possession, or control of any list used in compiling the master list, including any sources designated by the Judicial Council as supplementary sources, shall make the list
available to the county clerk at all reasonable times.
ISSS

78-46-11. Master jury wheel — Selection of
names to put in jury w h e e l — Certification of namee
(1) A master jury wheel shall be maintained by
each county in the office of the county clerk. The
county clerk shall place the names or identifying
numbers of prospective jurors taken from the master
list into the jury wheel. The jury wheel shall be emptied and refilled in December each year pursuant to
this a c t
(2) The number of names to be selected by the
county clerk shall be determined by the judge or
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judges of the district court for the county. Karnes
shall be selected, as far as practical, from each of the
voting districts within the county in proportion to the
number of voters within each voting district Names
shall be selected in a random but uniform pattern
designed to select names from each entire list of
names contained in the master list of the county. The
name of any person selected may not be excluded by
the county clerk except if the county dark knows the
person to be deceased.
(3) Tne name and address of each person selected
shall be certified by the county clerk and immediately placed in the master jury wheel.
tsss
76-46-12. Drawing prospective Juror names
from master wheel — Juror qualification form — Content — Completion —
Penalties for failure to complete or
misrepresentation — Joint jury wheel
for court authorised.
(1) From time to time and a s prescribed by the district court, t h e county clerk shall draw a s many
names from t h e master jury wheel a s t h e district,
circuit, justice, or juvenile courts by order determine,
shall alphabetize the list of names drawn, and shall
furnish it to the court for which drawn. The names
drawn may not be disclosed to any person other than
pursuant to thi6 act or by specific order of the court.
(2) The clerk of the court for which prospective juror names are furnished shall mail each prospective
juror s juror qualification form and instructions to
complete the form and return it by mail to the clerk
within ten days after it is received.
(3) (a) The juror qualification form i s subject to
approval by the district court a s to matters of
form. It shall elicit the name, address, and age of
the prospective juror and if the person:
(i) i s a citizen of the United States;
(ii) i s a resident of the county;
(iii) is able to read, speak, and understand
the English language;
(iv) has any physical or mental disability
impairing the person's capacity to render
jury service;
(v) has ever been convicted of a felony; or
(vi) is on active duty in the military service of the United States.
(b) The form shall contain the person's declaration that the responses are true to the best of
the person's knowledge. It shall also include a
statement that a willful misrepresentation of a
material fact may be punished upon conviction
by s fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment
for not more than 30 days or both. Notarization of
the form i s not required.
(4) If a person receives a juror qualification form
and IB not able to complete it, another person may do
so and he shall indicate the form has been completed
for the person to whom it was sent, the name of the
person completing the form, and the reason for h i s
completing t h e form.
(5) If it appears there i s an omission, ambiguity, or
error i n a returned form t h e clerk shall return t h e
form to t h e prospective juror with instructions to
make the necessary addition, clarification, or correction and to return t h e form to t h e clerk within ten
days after i t i s received.
(6) Any prospective juror who foils to return a com*
pleted form as instructed shall be directed by the
court to immediately appear before the clerk to complete the form. A person who fails to appear is subject
to the procedures and penalties in Section 7646-20.

78-46-16

(7) Any person who willfully misrepresents s materia] fact on s juror qualification form for the purpose of avoiding or securing service as a juror is
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be
fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more
than 30 days, or both.
(6) The names of all qualified jurors obtained from
the list shall be placed in the qualified jury wheel
maintained by each court and shall constitute the
court's source of jurors for a period of time the judges
of the court determine.
(9) Judges of the district court and of any circuit
court within the district may by agreement establish
a joint qualified jury wheel from which jurors required by both courts may be drawn or pooled.
isee
76-46*13. Drawing juror panels — Notice to jurors — Procedure when shortage of jurors drawn — Public inspection of
n a m e s drawn and content of qualification forms — Exception.
(1) Jury panels shall be drawn from the qualified
jury wheel as needed or ordered by the court.
(2) A judge of any court may direct the clerk of that
court to draw and assign the number of qualified jurors the judge deems necessary for one or more jury
panels. Tnc clerk shall draw a t random from the
qualified jury wheel the number of qualified jurors
specified. The qualified jurors drawn for jury service
shall be assigned at random by the clerk to each jury
panel in a manner prescribed by the court.
(3) If s grand or trial jury is ordered to be drawn,
the clerk shall cause each person drawn for jury service to be notified when and where t h e juror is to
report for service. The notice may be given by telephone or by service of a summons, either personally
or by first class mail which is addressed to the juror's
usual residence, business, or post office address.
(4) If there is an unanticipated shortage of available trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel,
the court may require the clerk of the court to summon a sufficient number of trial jurors selected at
random by t h e court from the qualified jury wheel.
(5) The names of qualified jurors drawn from t h e
qualified jury wheel and the contents of jury qualification forms shall be made available to the public
unless the court determines in any instance that this
information, in the interest of justice, should be kept
confidential or its use limited in whole or in part.
1SS6

76-46-14. Qualified prospective Jurors n o t e x empt from Jury service.
No qualified prospective juror is exempt from jury
service.
1*79
76-46-15. Excuse from jury service.
(1) Tne court, upon request of a prospective juror or
on its own initiative, shall determine on the basis of
information provided on the juror qualification form
or by interview with the prospective juror, or by other
competent evidence, whether the prospective juror
should be excused from jury service. The clerk shall
enter this determination in the space provided on the
Juror qualification form.
(2) A person may be excused from jury service by
the court, a t its discretion, upon a snowing of undue
hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity
for any period the court deems necessary.
1ST*
76-46-16. J u r y not selected in conformity with
chapter — Procedure t o challenge —
Relief available — Exclusive remedy.
(1) Within seven days after the moving party dis*

78-49-17
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covered, or by the exerdee of diligence could hava
discovered the grounds therefore, and in any event
before the trial jury is sworn to try the case, a party
may move to stay the proceedings or to quash an indictment, or for other appropriate relief; on the
ground of substantial failure to comply with this act
in selecting a grand or trial jury.
(2) Upon motion filed under this section containing
a sworn statement of acts which if true would constitute a substantial failure to comply with this act, the
moving party may present testimony of the county
clerk, the clerk of the court, any relevant records and
papers not public or otherwise available used by the
jury commission or the clerk, and any other relevant
evidence. If the court determines that in selecting
either a grand or a trial jury there has been a sub*
stantial failure to comply with this act and it appears
that actual and substantial injustice and prejudice
has resulted or will result to a party in consequence
of the failure, the court shall stay the proceeding*
pending the selection of the jury in conformity with
this set, quash an indictment, or grant other appropriate relief.
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are
the exclusive means by which a person accused of a
crime, the state, or a party in a civil case may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with this act,
use
78-46-17. Preservation of records and papers by
county clerk.
All records and papers compiled and msintamod by
the county clerk in connection with the selection and
service of jurors shall be preserved by the clerk for
four years after the master jury wheel used in the
selection is emptied and refilled and for any longer
period ordered by the court.
las*
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(1) An employer may not deprive an employee of
employment or threaten or otherwise coerce the employee regarding his employment because the employee receives a summons, responds to it, serves as a
juror, or a grand juror, or attends court for prospeotive jury or grand jury service.
(2) Any employer who violates this section is guilty
of criminal contempt and upon conviction may he
fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.
(3) If any employer discharges an employee in violation of this section, the employee within 30 days
may bring a civil action for recovery of wages lost as a
result of the violation and for an order requiring the
reinstatement of the employee. Damages recoverable
may not exceed lost wages for six weeks. If the employee prevails, the employee shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee fixed by the court
isss
78-46-22. C o o t administrator's duties and responsibilities.
If any court establishes the office of a court administrator, the court may by order provide that the responsibilities given to the court or court clerk by this
act may be assigned to and performed by the court
administrator.
isrt

CHAPTERS 47 TO 50
RESERVED
PART VI
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
CHAPTER 51
GENERAL PROVISIONS

78-46-18. Compensation and travel expenses of
jurors.
A juror shall be compensated at the rate of $17.
However, if he travels more than 50 miles, he shall be
paid 25 cents a mile under Subsection 21-5-4(4) for
the distance in excess of 50 miles in going only for
each day of required attendance at sessions of the
court*
isse
78-46-19. Limitations on jury service*
In any two-year period a person shall not be required:
(1) to serve on more than one grand jury;
(2) to serve as both a grand or trial juror; or
(3) to attend court for prospective jury service
as a trial juror more than 10 court days, except if
to complete service in a particular
78-46-20. Peiisitiee for fsihire to appear or conv
plete jury servicer
A person summoned for jury service who mils to
appear or to complete jury service as directed shall be
ordered by the oourt to immediately appear and show*
cause for failure to comply with the summons Any
person who fails to show good cause for noncompliance with the summons is guilty of criminal contempt
and may be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned
net more than three days, or both.
78-16-21. Employer not to discharge or threaten
employee for jury semlue — Criminal
penalty — Civil action by employee.

78-61-L
78-61-2.
78-51-3.
78-51-4.
78-51-5.
78-51-6.
78-51-7.
78-51-8.
78-51-9.
78-51-10.
78-51-1L
78-51-12.

78-51-13.
78-51-14
78-51-18.
78-51-16.
78-51-17.
78-51-18.
78-51-19.

Utah 9Ute Ear — Qualification for
membership.
Board of commissioners — Number —
Term — Vacancies.
Territorial divisions.
Number of commissioners from each division,
Nomination of commissioners.
Election of commissioners.
Organization of board.
Meetings — Annual and special — Notice.
Bylaws.
Admission to practice law — Qualifications — Enrollment — Oath — Fees,
Roll of attorneys and counselors.
Disciplinary proceedings — Rules established by board — Disciplinary committees — Written response to complainants — Proceedings subject to
open meetings law.
Board of commissioners — Powers —
Conduct of members of bar holding Judicial office.
Rules and regulations — Supreme Court
to approve.
Hearings and witnesses.
Rights of accused.
Record of proceedings
Findings and report.
Review by Supreme Court — Inherent
powers of courts not affected.

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section
1. [Three departments of government]

Section 1. [Three departments of government]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
History: Const 1896.
Crots-Referenoe*. — Executive department, Utah Const, Art VH
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art VIE

Legislative department, Utah Const, Art
VI.
Municipal powers not delegable, Utah
Const, Art VI, I 28.
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APPENDIX II
Transcript «
i

Pertinent Portion.1-., of Juror Voir Dire

(focusing on Barber, Pike, Heap, Ludlow, Trump, and Pickering)
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:he

2

Defendant Corey Lynn Brooks unawfully and
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pressing or urgent business
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then***

18
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19
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20
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•

om

Your name?
:
THE COURT:
:

24

THE COURT:

25

i • 3 UROR:

Frank what?
B a x I m mi

What

II

m ni

1

i

ir .

problem?

J

00268

list my wife has had knee surgery
take her

for therapy

Wednesdays

and I'm

three times a week,

and Fridays at 5:00 o'clock
THE C O U R T :

Could

other

required

to

Monday,

in

Sandy.

arrangements

be

made?
A JUROR:

I have been unable

THE C O U R T :
A JUROR:
from

today she goes

therapy

has been

You are working

was:

out other

in to the doctor

it?

to see

if the

successful.
I understand.

But

the

Is there any other possibility

to work

arrangements?
A JUROR:

trust

on

far.

W e l l , she has until -- a week

THE C O U R T :
question

to so

with

I don't

have anyone

I could

time are the

therapy

her.
THE C O U R T :

What

sess ions?
A JUROR:

Therapy

THE C O U R T :
therapist

is at 5:00

You haven't

p.m.

called

to see if that could be moved

back

the
20 or 30

minutes?
A JUROR:

No I haven't,

THE C O U R T :
recess.

So, if you

appreciate having

Ordinarily, we are in

are selected,

you see

the Court

would

if that -- the time could

so

be

00269

II

changed;

and w e ' d recess

21

*- ~ d o t h a t .

31

that could

in t i m e e n o u g h

Given that accommodatio:

Jo y o u f e e l

you serve?

4]

A JUROR:

51

devote my undivided

6]

circumstances.

7J

I a m *><•>* s n r *

attention

THE COURT:

• 81 ,

Your

91

that

tt *~^

e under the

Thank y o u .

name?

' A JUROR:

Gary

G. Pickering.

Tfirt a J e h o v a h ' s W i t n e s s ,

10

stated

1]

precedent.

12

organization

13

thought,

14

g o in d i f f e r e n t

directions

15

m a k e s nt = • f eel

that

16

t h e Court, tr k n o w

17

before,

It J.& K i n d

of «

••-- g i v e n

weighing

what

r a;;- m a t t e r

**

great

scriptures

seem

on that

people

*~* ™ ^ c o n s c i e n c e

because

. **. ~ - w a n t

of time

iriency.
1 understand.

19

"As jurors,

it i s y o u r

20

the facts in a given case

21

ne u m p u e ,
•:

23

25

among our

wu m a k e

TBE COURT:

24

** n o t a

I s h o u 1 dn ' t d o t h a t .

that up-front

As 1

amount of

-18

22

to allow you

tried within

function

to find

It's the Court's function

basically,

ai*J a s s u r e

the framework

that the

o f t h e R u l e s < : >f

oceduie anu nuitb u± Evidence, and instruct
t h e jury
"Ai

accept the

si

00270|

1

A JUROR:

2

THE C O U R T :

3]

Education.
Did you work outside of the

home?

4

A JUROR:

5

THE C O U R T :

6

A JUROR:

THE C O U R T :

10

A JUROR:

11

THE C O U R T :
prior jury

A JUROR:

14

THE COVPT:

Y e s , he is r e t i r e d .
And have you ever been on

No# I haven't.
Have you been in court as a

party or a witness?

16

A JUROR:

171

THE C O U R T :

18

Is he retired?

service?

13

15

He was the Murray City

Treasurer.

9

12

What did your husband do for

a living?

7|
8

No.

No.
This is your

first

experience?

19

A JUROR:

20

THE C O U R T :

21

A JUROR:

Yes.
Thank y o u .
My name is Larry P i k e .

22

w i f e ' s name is Mary Ann Pike*

23

ages 15 and 1 0 ; b o t h b o y s .

24

engineer.

We have two c h i l d r e n ,

I'm an e l e c t r i c a l

T have a m a s t e r ' s degree from

25] U n i v e r s i t y of O k l a h o m a *

My

the

My wife works for Federal
35

00274

Express in their sales office.
TF'i F! (7011 f s T :

If • i v * • y n u

LUM-II

jury

< I H .I

before?
A
jury, yes.
THE
JUROR

v-ears.

THE

remeniL

A JUROR

a

*t.

.

10

THE COURT:

11

A JUROR

. _.

12

THE L - •

o you remen.ber

13
14

case or cases you were involved
A JUROR

'*»R. if invo".

15

robbery or burglary, just possession.

16

THE COURT:

17

A JUROR:

18

THE COURT:

IS

was an acquittal

. irearms; not

A criminal charge?
Yes.
Do you recall whether there

conviction?

20

A

21

THE COURT:

:

We found him ouiJiy.
Did you serve on more than

??
23

A JUROR

24

THE

^

COURT

Taxrr* V O "

.
hppn

fn

rftnrf

as

v± o w i t n e s s ?

„
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A JUROR:
THE €OURT:

No, I have not.
Other than that, you've only

had the one court experience?
A JUROR:
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
single.

I have no kids.

Bar & Grill.

That's correct.
Thank you.
My name is Shane Peck,

I'm

I am a cook at Bulwinkle's

I've never served on jury duty.
THE COURT:

Have you been in court as a

party or a witness?
A JUROR:
THE COURT:
A JUROR:

No.
What is your educatior?
I'm a cook at Bulwinkle's Bar

& Grill.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
wife is Evelyn.

What is your schooling?
Haven't graduated yet.
All right.

Thank you.

My name is Daniel R. Heap.

My

I have two kids that are both married

now; one is 23 and 21.

I work for Salt Lake County

Fleet Maintenance for the last 20 years.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:

Your education?
High school education plus two

years of trade tech.
THE COURT:

Does your wife work outside
37
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the home?
A JUROR:

Yes, she does.
¥u~*~ kind cf work?

THE COURT:
A JUROR:

She
w

THE COURT:
6l

a photofinisher.

Ao

w ~ ~ - ~-

3

jury

before?

7

A JUROR:

No.

8

THE COURT:

nave

91 party or a witness?
10

A JUROR:

11

THE COURT:

12

No.
This is your

":st

exper ience?

13

A JUROR:

14

THE COURT

15

A JUROR

16

a waSti r ' J

17

husband's name

name

is A l t a L u d l o w .

n G r u b s t a k e Pe
Ludlow.

He works

181 Valley Resor:
191

.

have a three-and-a-half-year-old

22

daughter

And x

201 never served jury duty.
211

" an

We

have
1

graduation.
a

THE COURT:

231 party or a witness.
24

1 JUROR •

25

THE COURT:

N
f

"

38

"

.
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1

A JUROR:

2

my husband's name

3

children;

4

have one year

5

mother

6

before.

My name

is Arthur

the youngest

is Phyllis Geurts, and

Geurts.

is 18, and

of c o l l e g e .

all these y e a r s .

I've

We have

the oldest

been

I've never

And what was the other

8

THE C O U R T :
party

11

THE C O U R T :

A JUROR:

14

of U t a h .

15

home.

What does your

He

THE C O U R T :

in court

as a

husband

do

is retired

from

the

in engineering

What did

State

out of the

he do when

he

worked?

18

A JUROR:

He was a traffic

and

safety

engineer.

20

THE C O U R T :

21

A JUROR:

22

single.

23

Quality Verification

24

duty.

25

Have you been

He does consulting

16

19

question?

a living?

13

17

on a jury

No, I h a v e n f t .

A JUROR:

for

I

or a witness?

10

12

is 3 4 .

a stay-at-home
served

7

9

eight

I'm

employed

Thank
My name

you.
is Karen H a l l #

at Surety Life Insurance
Clerk.

THE C O U R T :

I've

never

Have you been

39

served

Ifm

and
as a
on

in court

jury

as

a

00278

1] haven't

been

2

ci a?-

witness.

T H E COU

3

court?

4
••51
61

A

s.

THECOURT

I I
/ I Ii

A

71
81

jury duty befo

- T H E COURT

hI

1 i i, i s y o u :;i •
»J

education?

i 1111 ( .

I ilnl

your

husband

do

for

a

91

A JUROR

unemployed #

10

THE COURT

11

A JUROR

name

medically.

Frank Barber

My

12
13

Penny's

14

Suthei

15

Engineer

4

-. Floor

Supervisor

Evans &
ng

an

Engineering

Degre*

t:.~

r

\~I >'

16
171

THECOURT :

19

' A JUROR:

20
211

Till'
•

THE COURT

23l
2 41
2 5|

l" Ill I- 1 'I

II a \ e y o u b e e n i n c o u r t

Nc ,

:s i r

" I 'II: / ,1
i: i c i «„

A JUROR:
and

om

as a

:; • i

a i :> u t

children,

children;

do

one

46

I 'I
• THE COURT: . T h a n k
42

j ou,

00281

A JUROR:
years ago.

This has probably been 24

I remember.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:

Okay.
My little boy was a baby.

THE COURT:
A JUROR:
husband

Thank you.
My name is Debra Trump.

is Darrell Trump.

My

I work at U*S. -- no, I

work at First Interstate Bank, and my husband
to the U of U in Business Finance.

is going

We have four

children; 11, 9, 5 and four months.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
THE COURT:

Your education?
One year of college.
Have you been on a jury

before?
A JUROR:

No f just two weeks ago they

called .
THE COURT:

Have you been in court as a

party or a witness?

A JUROR:
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
THE COURT:
A JUROR:

I have been a witness.
What kind of case?
Robbery.
How long ago did this occur?
Eight years ago.
Did that go to trial?
We just came in to pick him
51
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]

on*- r,

ineup,

2
3

THE COURT:
subsequen 1

• p? .

4

UROR:
THE r

5
6

resulted

And were you involved

No.

RT:

3

••

in a plea a g r e e m e n t

7

i" i

8

THE COURT:

i

i! i

whether that

trial?

a <i

Any other court

experience?

9
10

a u g nt a
f o r g e r y and had

ic* h i m o u t of

ineup,

1]
12

JUROR:

13

Pleaded

THE

14

'ience?
That f s i I .

JUROR:

15

THI«

16

A JUROR:

?"*' am a r e t i r e d

"! "' i,

teacher

19

mail

20

year.

i'« " I i i > > I

Til I -! • ' I'1

22

is R a e C h r i s t e n s e n

of "I."11 Il y e .i i. if ; J"1'

v/4. p h y s i c a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d .
carrier.

' 'i I |

My name

181

21

guilty.

My. h u s b a n d

i:
red

-1 I - 111 i n t i

i

JUROR

then r

|

I

last

educa-iun*

years of

231 elementary educat I < ::: :
n i.
24

THE COURT:

25

*

* you teach?

52
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1

a law

enforcement

officer.

2

THE COURT:

3

A JUROR:

Elaine Olsen.

4

A JUROR:

Brenda Rhodes.

5

Your name?

husband is a policeman.

6

THE COURT:

7

A JUROR:

8

Karen Carlyle.

THE COURT:

10

A JUROR:

I have a

Anyone else?

My father - in-law, now, is the

head of security for E-Systems.

12

THF COURT:

13

A JUROR:

14

THE COURT:

15

A JUROR:

16

Your name?

retired uncle who was a policeman.

9

11

My cousin's

police

in

the

Your name?
Alta Ludlow.
Anyone else?
My son was in the military

army.

17

THE COURT:

18

A JUROR:

19

THE COURT:

Rae Christensen.
Are there any of you who --

2 01

assault, generally,

21

verbal

22

your threats.

23

ordinarily

24

physical

25

been any of you who have been physically or verbally

threat

an

with

in

Your name?

the

a civil
apparent

sense,

is m a k i n g

ability

to c a r r y

a
out

Battery, on the other hand, is
inappropriate

contact.

Within

or

that

offensive
context,

touching,
have

so

there

67
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1

assaulted

battered?

2

1

Your name?

31

A JUROR:

4

had

5

window.

Alta Ludlow.

Ten years ago I

ow me out of a two-story

6

TFM

7

Eave any ... j _ _ ..-- members of your

e

9

<„''.n.il."r ,

Anyone else?

iends or associates that have been

f an i

1

assaulted or battered?

10

Your name*

n

A JUROR

Rachel Roatcap.
n

12
13

Brenda Rhodes-

JUROR:

was married to someone who tried
THE COURT:

18
19

have

been

victims

ner.

Are there any of you who

down

on

this

end,

Pickering?

22

25

uu M U

tarting

211 M r .

My neighbor

robbery?

20

23

Have there any -- here's a

hand .

1 6

17

ose broken at a

basketball game by a gang member.
THE COURT:

15

Three weeks

4

A JUROR:
Lake

--

just

i

y house

trying
was
THE

think,

robbed
COURT:

of

n

Street,

put

the

here

years

in

Salt

together

items.
Entry

int

?

ffi

00307

A JUROR:

They came into my home,

THE COURT:

That's called a burglary.

A JUROR:

I am sorry.

THE COURT:
A JUROR:

And items were taken?
Yes.

THE COURT:

All right.

We'll enlarge it

to burglaries, as well, okay?
A JUROR:

Yes --

THE COURT:
A JUROR:

Your name?
Marilyn Woodside.

My battery

and my CD radio were stolen -THE COURT:

Okay.

A JUROR:

-- five or six years ago from

my car.
THE COURT:

Anyone else?

Your name?
A JUROR:

Rae Christensen.

girlfriend was robbed.

My

She lives in West Valley.

This case does not involve Lucille Sorenson?
THE COURT:

No.

A JUROR:

I was robbed.

I was working

at U.S. Thrift & Loan, and at gunpoint, two men came
in and made me get on the floor and robbed the bank.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:

And your name?

Debra Trump.

69
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" • THE C0 UI

nna ago was that?
w

A JUROR:

«

a

a half years ago.

THE <

t.

Other people back in here?
A
was

7aomi Sandberg.
__

__

Your name?
My husband

head with w .rifle, and then

hi
TEE COURT:
A JUROR

Flo%. 1 • : • i g ago has that been?
i I • • ::> i 1 f I e years.
1 1 ai 11 ;; ou .

THE COURT:
Anyone else?
JUROR

M i: s •

Geurts?

,, w w o d i f f e r e n t

occasions

" « ^n ^ "^locked back door and

w e ' v G In , 11 •! somebody watake inj purse.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:
roken into

**A

4-K**?

nv**,
„„,= „ *

a.^f Oui

stole things.

THE COURT:
JUROR:
there.

W«D

Your name?
Rita L u d l o w .

N o c ~ ^ v->~

And then two and % a half years ago, both mine

and my husban

les were broken into four times

*.. w..w month? windows broke out, stereos taken,
consoles broken up.
THE COURT:
* JUROR:

Anyone else?

T,

-~

u

~*

Daniel Heap.

X f ve

70
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had my house broke into before, and our vehicles twice
in the last couple of years.
THE COURT:
A JUROR:

Thank you.

Larry Pike.

As a child, our

home was burglarized when we were there.
THE COURT:

Anyone else?

If you or a member of your family were
involved in a case such as the one before you# would
you be willing to have your case or theirs tried by
eight people in the same frame of mind as you are now
in?
Possessing the state of mind that you
have, is there anything that would prevent any of you
from acting fairly and impartially without prejudice
to the substantial rights of either party in this
case?
Is there any reason known to any of you
why you could not try the case fairly and impartially
upon any evidence and without any bias for or against
either party to the action?

Other than Mr. Pickering,

and you've indicated your feelings.
From your answers, I understand that
each of you individually now declares to me that you
can listen attentively to the evidence, can apply the
law to the facts which you may find to exist and can

71

00310

1

r e a c h a v e r d i c t w h i c h is fair and i m p a r t i a l as to e a c h

2

p a r t y in t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y .

3

for any reason feel that you cannot?

41
5

Does the State have any additional
questions?

6|
7

A r e t h e r e a n y of y o u w h o

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, sometimes

jurors for various reasons find it very difficult to

81 sit in judgment over a fellow human being.
9

And even

if the evidence were such that it would be beyond a

10

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t # w o u l d find it d i f f i c u l t t o c o n v i c t

11

somebody.

12

If t h e C o u r t c o u l d ask t h a t
THE COURT:

question?

In our s y s t e m , t h e j u r i e s

13

find t h e f a c t s .

T h e b u s i n e s s of p u n i s h m e n t

14

b y t h e C o u r t or t h r o u g h of D e p a r t m e n t of C o r r e c t i o n s .

15

A r e there any of you w h o have any difficulty

16

in j u d g m e n t o n a n o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g w h e r e t h e

17

punishment could be incarceration

181 P e n i t e n t i a r y , f i n e or o t h e r

is h a n d l e d

in t h e U t a h

sitting

State

forfeiture?

19

M r . Pickering.

20

Anyone

21

Any other questions?

22

MR. BLAYLOCK:

else?

I don't believe so, your

23] Honor.
24

THE COURT:

Do you pass the jury for

2 51 cause?

72

MR, BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:

If we could approach?

All right.

Does the defendants ~

does the

Defendant have any questions?
MR, PORTERFIELD:

We do, your Honor.

We

would like to have the Court ask the members of the
jury panel whether or not any of them would have
difficulty acquitting a person if they were convinced
that the State had not met its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt; although, they might be inclined
to find that there was some evidence that a crime had
been committed, and whether the members of the jury
could make the distinction between proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and that burden of proof which the
State might present which meets that level of proof?
THE COURT:

In our system, defendants

are charged with crimes by a document we call an
information*

The fact that the Defendant stands

charged of a crime creates no presumptions.
to draw no inferences, therefrom.

You are

He has a

presumption, constitutionally, that he is presumed to
be innocent.

The burden is upon the State of Utah to

prove each and every element of the alleged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Would any of you, if not persuaded to
73
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that level of conviction, have any difficulty
acquitting a defendant in a case such as this?
A JUROR:

I could not, Judge, your

Honor•
THE COURT:

All right, Mr. Pickering.

Any other questions, Mr. Porterfield?
MR. PORTERFIELD:
Honor.

I don't think so, your

Thank you.
THE COURT:

Would both attorneys

approach the bench?
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT:

We'll be in brief recess.

I'll allow you to leave and go to the restroom.

But

remember to mark your chair with an "X" so you can
keep track of where you are sitting.

We need to keep

you in the same order.
There's some of you who we are going to
call in to chambers.

Don't wander too far away*

If

your name is called, we would like you to come in to
chambers and pursue the voir dire privately.
MR. PORTERFIELD:
Honor.

Pardon me, your

For the convenience of the witnesses who I

don't believe we are going to call today, might I
excuse them?
THE COURT:

You may.
74
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MR. PORTERFIELD:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Just step out, and we'll see

you in chambers.
(In chambers.)
THE COURT:

Mrs. Geurts.

Mr. Blaylock

indicates your husband was a witness in a case.
Tell us a little bit about the case.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

He was witness in a case

where Dan Jenson's son was killed.
that?

Last summer?

crosswalk.

Do you remember

Did he talk to you?

It was a

The boys were walking across a crosswalk,

and got hit by a driver.
A JUROR:

Was that out in Sandy?

MR. BLAYLOCK:
A JUROR:

It was out in Sandy.

I remember him being on that.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

He was a witness for the

other side.
Also, I -- I lived in your area for
awhile, and I believe you are in the same stake.
A JUROR:

That's right.

MR. BLAYLOCK:
A JUROR:

Okay.

33rd Ward?
I am living in the 11th

Ward.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I wasn't sure that you

were aware of that relationship.

I was the attorney

75
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for the prosecution on the case when your husband
testified for the Defense.
A JUROR:

I did not know that.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

You weren't aware of

that?
THE COURT:

All that he just told you #

does that make a bit of difference to you?
A JUROR:
THE COURT:

No.
You feel that you could

fairly and impartially serve?
A JUROR:
THE COURT:

Yes #

I think I could.

Do you have any questions?

MR. PORTERFIELD:

Yes, thank you.

You don't believe that the references
that Mr. Blaylock's made to your husband's testimony
or the fact that you might have been associated
through the church would have an effect on you?
A JUROR:

No.

MR. PORTERFIELD:

Okay.

Thank you very

much .
(Phyllis Geurts leaves, Debra Trump comes in.)
THE COURT:

Mrs. Trump, you indicated

during the voir dire to the Court that you were a
victim of a robbery.
A JUROR:

Yes.

76

00315

THE COURT:

Can you just go through the

details, tell us how long ago, the place of
employment, again, the circumstances?
A JUROR:

You bet.

It was in -- let's

see, I thought it was eight years ago, but it is nine
years ago, in American Fork, U.S. Thrift & Loan*
the manager had just left.
lunch.

And

He was going to buy us all

There was just three of us that worked there.

He left.

And he was gone about -- he just probably

got out of -- you know, quite aways away.

And two

gentlemen came in and pulled out a gun and said:
"We'd like all your money.*

And he told me to get on

the floor, and told the other girl to clean all the
money.

They didn't want any coin.

And then:

"Don't

get off the floor until we are far enough" -- you
know, for so much time.

Then we got up, and they were

gone, and we called the police.
THE CODRT:

Given that experience, do

you feel that you could listen attentively to the
evidence in this case, consider only the evidence in
this case, follow the Court's instructions on the law
and reach a fair and impartial verdict?
A JUROR:

Yes, I do*

THE COURT:

Mr* Blaylock, do you have

any additional questions?
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1

MR. BLAYLOCK:

2

THE COURT:

31

MR. P O R T E R F I E L D :

4

understood

from your

51

the courtroom

61

with lineup

No.

M r . Porterfield?

answers to the questions out

that you've had

A JUROR:

81

MR. P O R T E R F I E L D :

10

lineup
cases

MR. P O R T E R F I E L D :

13

And

14

that

15

identification?

I believe you said
resulted

16

in doing
two

those

different

Yes.

that

17

about

a year

181

bank.

191

the drivers

20

lineup.

21

ago*

I work

of your

It wasn't

then we picked

23

A JUROR:

24

MR, P O R T E R F I E L D :

him.

the

We got

him out of the

Do you recall

the lineup p r o c e d u r e , going

that's a particularly

just

at a drive-up window at

And he used a fake I.D.
license, and

said.

convictions

W e l l , the forgery was

MR. P O R T E R F I E L D :
through

-- I believe you

there were two

as a result partly

A JUROR:

I

experiences

--

12

I

And

identifications -- those were

A JUROR:

251

of

Two.

11

221

a couple

in

procedures?

7

91

M r s . Trump, I

through

going

that?

Yes, I do.
Do you feel

that

reliable way of picking

out

78
W5r?

--

1

A JUROR:

In our case, it was.

And I

21 knew him, you know.
31
4

MR* PORTERFIELD:
him --

5
6

You say you knew

I didnft know him, but I knew

A JUROR:

that that was him without a doubt.

7

MR. PORTERFIELD:

And out of those two

8

experiences then -- and you were also, I believe --

9

you said you were -- you said you were robbed at

10

gunpoint.

11

A JUROR:

12

MR. PORTERFIELD:

13

witness to a robbery.

14

same case?

Yes.
You have been a

That was the same -- one in the

15

A JUROR:

Yes.

16

MR. PORTERFIELD:

So they were all tied

17

together.

And, basically, you've been involved in at

18

least two procedures that involve lineups, and then

19

convictions and witness -- you being a witness?

20

A JUROR:

21

MR. PORTERFIELD:

22

Yes.
Okay.

I don f t think I

have anything further.

23

THE COURT:

Given that lineup

24

experience, do you feel that you can impartially

25

serve?
79
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A JUROR:

Yes, I do.

21

THE COURT:

3j

Thank you.

41

Anyone else?

Anything else?

51
6

(Discussion off the record)
(Debra Trump leaves, Alta Ludlow comes into chambers.)

7

THE COURT:

You have been a, victim of

81 crimes on a number of occasions.
9
10

Can you just go

through some of that again a little bit to refresh our
recollect ions?

11

A JUROR:

When I was about 13, our house

12

was broken into, and a lot of our things were taken.

13

1 remember coming home to the doors open, and looking

14

for -- walking in and just seeing everything a mess,

151 and feeling, you know, hurt.

And then my mom came

161 home, and she was really upset.
17

We called the police,

and they couldn't get fingerprints, or anything.

181

Then I had a real close friend who kind

191 of went off the deep end one day and tried to throw me
201 off a two-story window.
211 She was home.

It was in my mother's house.

So were my two little sisters.

22] cause me to have a breakdown.
23
24]

It did

It was really

traumatic.
And then our cars being broken into,

251 that was, I think -- you know, that was just really

I
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hard #

in one month, four times, both vehicles.

We

moved, but, you know, it f s just - - it can only get so
far away.
THE COURT:

Given those experiences, do

you feel that you can listen to the evidence presented
in this case, apply the Court's instructions on the
law, reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case?
A JUROR:

I really don't know.

I mean,

just talking about it makes me feel kind of sick.

I

think if somebody tried to hurt me, or, you know, if I
were to put myself in, say, the victim's
circumstances, I might just decide because I know how
it feels.
THE COURT:

Mr. Blaylock.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

I have no reason to

excuse -- I mean, I have no objection.
THE COURT:

Do you have any questions?

MR. PORTERFIELD:

Thank you, your

Honor•
Being a victim is a terrible thing.
There's a tendency sometimes to assume that there's
retribution that can be gotten when you -- someone is
convicted -- charged with a crime, rather.

Based on

what you said, do you think that there might be a
tendency on your part to emotionally -- and
81

00320

understandably so -- but emotionally react on the
facts of this case, and maybe cloud your judgment a
little bit about whether or not you could decide my
client's guilt or innocence independent of that
reaction that you talked about, that sick feeling?
A JUROR:

It would be hard.

I f ll be

honest •
MR. PORTERFIELD:
That's what we want you to be.
A JDROR:

Thank you very much.
We appreciate it.

I don't want to convict

someone just because of how I feel.
MR. PORTERFIELD:

But you think that

there might be a tendency.
THE COURT:

Thank you; appreciate it.

(Alta Ludlow leaves, Steve Schreier comes in.)
THE COURT:

Mr. Schreier, during the

voir dire, you indicated you served on one military
court of justice and had also experience with guns.
And in your employment, you were involved in security
kind of work, is that true?
A JUROR:
THE COURT:

That's affirmative.
Do you want to just outline

some of that again briefly for us.
A JUROR:

I hesitate to detail any

intricacies that were involved because of that
82
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ll

I don't have anything else.

2

THE COURT:

31

Anyone else?

4

MR. PORTERFIELD:

Thank you.

I don't believe so,

51 your Honor.
61

MR. BLAYLOCK:

7

THE COURT:

8

We are done.

Any objection to taking Alta

Ludlow off by consent?

9

MR. BLAYLOCK:

No.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PORTERFIELD:

12

You agree?
Absolutely, your

Honor.

13

THE COURT:

Does the State pass the jury

14] for cause?
15
161

MR. BLAYLOCK:

the understanding that she's excused. Number 17.

17
18

With that exception, with

THE COURT:

Does the Defendant pass the

jury for cause?

191

MR. PORTERFIELD:

We do f your Honor,

2Oi

with the same exception.

21

Pickering we should mutually agree to strike f

22

okay with you?

23
24
25

THE COURT:

We did have -- oh f I suppose
is that

Well # we won't get that low,

but I've stricken him.
MR. PORTERFIELD:

Okay.
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APPENDIX III
Contingent Motion to Supplement Record with Barber Affidavit
and
Affidavit of Juror Frank Barber

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
J, KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
Attorneys for Appellee
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

V.

I

COREY LYNN BROOKS,

x

Defendant-Appellant.

STATE'S CONTINGENT MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD ON
APPEAL, AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM.
Case No. 920853-CA

:

Plaintiff-Appellee State of Utah, through counsel,
hereby makes this contingent motion to supplement the record on
appeal with the Affidavit of Frank R. Barber, who was a juror in
the trial of this case.

The original affidavit has been

submitted to this Court with this motion; a copy is attached to
the copy of this motion that is served upon defendant's appellate
counsel.

The State's Brief of Appellee is filed and served

concurrently with this motion.
MEMORANDUM
THE AFFIDAVIT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR FULLYADVISED RESOLUTION OF THIS APPEAL.
Defendant Brooks's leading point on appeal consists of
an argument the juror Frank Barber was "incompetent" by virtue of
a schedule conflict.

The conflict involved Mr. Barber's need to

transport his wife to physical therapy appointments.

Because of

the conflict, Mr. Barber asserted, "I am not sure that I could
devote my undivided attention to the case . . ." (Br. of
Appellant at 7-8). Although the trial court urged Mr. Barber to
make arrangements to resolve this conflict (id,.), the present
record on appeal does not reveal whether Mr. Barber did so.
In response to defendant's argument on appeal, the
State argues that Mr. Barber was neither "incompetent" nor
"biased" under the governing legal principles, such that there
was neither "plain error" nor "ineffective assistance of counsel"
stemming from the trial court's and counsel's decisions to not
excuse Barber for cause (Br. of Appellee at 13-16).
confident in the legal merit of this argument.

The State is

However, if this

Court does not accept the State's argument, the State believes it
would be appropriate and desirable to supplement the record on
appeal with juror Barber's affidavit.
In his affidavit, Mr. Barber recounts that upon being
selected to sit as a juror in this case, he did in fact make
arrangements to eliminate the conflict posed by his duty to his
wife.

Under Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it

appears appropriate to inform this Court of this fact, which did
not find its way into the original record.

See, e.g.. Sampson v.

Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.) (counsel must provide
appellate court with all evidence relevant to issues on appeal),
cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).
The State recognizes that it is unusual to obtain posttrial evidence from jurors.

In the interest of protecting juror

2

privacy, and particularly the privacy of juror deliberations, the
State does not wish to encourage such practice as a matter of
routine.

This case, however, presents unusual circumstances for

two reasons:

First, the legal issue advanced by defendant on

appeal appears to be one of first impression in Utah, such that
this Court's resolution of it cannot be predicted with certainty.
Second, this prosecution for aggravated robbery and burglary has
already gone through two full trials, the first of which ended in
a hung jury.

It appears that the robbery victim, Stephanie Vert,

was rather badly frightened by the robbery-burglary (see R. 45051, where Ms. Vert needed a recess to proceed with testimony; R.
457-58, describing her upset in the aftermath of the robbery
(these transcript excerpts are attached to this motion)).
Against the contingency that this Court may be
dissatisfied with the State's legal analysis upon the present
record, the State, in the interest of protecting the victim from
further traumatization in a possible third trial, asks that juror
Barber's affidavit be received into the record.

That affidavit

further supports the State's argument that any possible error in
seating juror Barber did not cause prejudice to defendant*
Supplementation of the record with Mr. Barber's affidavit will
not be necessary if this Court accepts the State's primary legal
argument, based upon the presently-constituted record; hence the
"contingent" nature of this motion.
As a contingent motion, the State believes that
resolution of it can properly await plenary consideration of this
3

appeal.

Therefore, absent an objection from defendant, or

contrary direction from this Court, the State does not request a
ruling on the motion at this time.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ &

d a y of March, 1993.

j^_
J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Motion and Supporting Memorandum was mailed, postage
pre-paid to ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
attorneys for defendant-appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

4

day of March, 1993.

ATTACHMENTS
(Barber Affidavit and Transcript Excerpts)

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK, Bar No.0367
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

AFFIDAVIT OF JUROR FRANK R.
Barber

-vsCOREY LYNN BROOKS,

Case No. 920853-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
Frank R. Barber, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

That I was a juror in the District Court trial of Corey

Lynn Brooks on March 24 through March 27, 1992.
2.

That I realize I have no obligation to comment on my

jury service, but I am doing so willingly.
3.

That

on the first day of the trial before

I was

selected as a juror, X told Judge Rigtrup that ay obligation to
take my wife to therapy for her knee might distract me making it
difficult for me to devote my undivided attention to the case
being tried.
4.

That Judge Rigtrup asked me to see about making other

arrangements for her to get to therapy, so during the break for
lunch after I had been selected as one of the jurors to hear the

case and before any of the witnesses had testified, I postponed
the appointments until the next week.
5.

That Judge Rigtrup inquired of me if he could have the

bailiff take my wife for the therapy so I informed him that it
was not a problem as I had made other arrangements for her
therapy.
6.

That I was not hampered in my deliberations by concern

for my wife's therapy appointment as I resolved that problem
before I heard any testimony or began deliberations with the
other jurors.
DATED this 18th day of March, 19933.

Frank R. Barber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /f

day of March,

-TOttL TESTIAWO*

Q.

OF

STEPUAN3i£ V/ECT I

What did he say besides '•This is the roan

that wants to purchase the ring"?
A,

He said that he was running late # and

that he wouldn't be at the house until 9:00

o'clock.

And then we hung up the phone.
Q.

What did you do?

A.

I got up and started to get ready for

Q.

What happened

A.

I was upstairs in the bathroom, and I

work •
then?

heard a knock at the front door.

So I walked down the

stairs, and opened the door # and I glanced over at the
oven -- it has a clock on it -- to see what time it
was •
Q.

What time was it?

A.

It was 8:57.

Q.

What happened

A.

I let him In the house.

then?
And it was cold

outside -Q.

You say you let him in the house. tfho

A.

Corey, the man that's sitting right

Q.

How was he dressed?

was it?

there.
Just take your

time.
210
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A.

He had. . •
THE COURT:

Would you like a brief

recess?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:

Could we?

We will be in recess for

five minutes.
(Jury Admonished & Recess.)
THE COURT:

You may resume the stand.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Are you okay now?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I asked you how Corey was dressed.

A.

He had a black jacket on, black Levi's,

a black pair of boots, a black hat and some glasses
that had a rainbow lens on them, and they were
florescent green.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

May I approach the

witness?
THE COURT:

You may.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Would you look at what's

been marked as State's Proposed Exhibit No. 4?
Can you identify that?
A.

These are the glasses that he wore the

morning he came to my house.
Q.

How can you recognize that?

A,

With the rainbow lenses and the
211
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1

florescent green and the way they are shaped.

They

21 are like goggles, almost? ski glasses.
31

Q.

Now, you say "rainbow/ what did you

41 mean by that?
5

A.

Well, the different colors.

6

a purple and green.

7

see blue and yellow.

When it hits the light, you can

81

Q.

Changes in the light?

91

A.

I would say, yes.

101
11

It has like

MR. BLAYLOCK:

May I approach the

witness?

121

TEE COURT:

You may.

13

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Would you look at what's

14] been marked State*s Proposed Exhibit No. 7?
15

Would you identify those?

16

A.

17

wearing.

181
19

Q.

22

The boots he was wearing.

A.

Yes.

Q.

After you saw him at the door there,

A.

What did you do?
I turned to walk into the kitchen, and

251 he followed me.
I

They were cowboy boots? pointed

toe.

231 what happened?
24]

Were they

cowboy boots?

2CJ
21

They look like the black boots he was

Be immediately asked where the ring
212
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A.

Yes*

unscrew the pipes,
pipe.

That's when I noticed I could
I could slip the handcuff off the

And by that time, the phone was ringing again,

and I picked up the phone.

And it was my mom.

And I

told her that he had a gun and to call the police.
And then I hung up the phone because I was so upset.
I just kept hanging up the phone.
The phone rang again, and it was someone
that my mom worked with, and they tried to keep me on
the phone, and again I just told them to call the
police and hung up the phone.
Q.

Did your mom arrive?

A,

It was about six minutes later when she

arrived at the house.

As soon as she walked in the

door, she picked up the phone and called the police.
They couldnft get a free line out at her work.
Q.

How long had Corey been in the house?

A.

Twelve minutes, because when I walked

upstairs after having the handcuffs on, I noticed the
clock.

It was about ten or eleven minutes after

9:00.
0.

Did the police come?

A.

Yes, they did.

Q.

Bow long was it after your mother

arrived that the police arrived?
218
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A.

I don't remember.

I was so upset I

couldn't -Q.

Do you recall how long you were upset

during the day?
A.

Two weeks?

I missed quite a few days of

work, and found it hard to go anywhere.
Q.

What do you mean?

A.

Just when you trust people, no one can

be trusted.

When I go into public places, I'm afraid.

Q.

Is that still today?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you tell us what this gun looked

like that he had?
A.

It was black, and I could tell that the

magazine went in the hand part of the gun.

And it had

a small, silver rim protruding out from the barrel of
the gun.
Q.

A small, silver --

A.

Rim.

Q.

Rim.

You said that was from the front

of the gun?
A.

The barrel, the end of the barrel.

Q.

Did you see Corey again after the 29th

of January of last year?
A.

We were called for a lineup.
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